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Introduction
In the last decade, the political institutions and practices under which eco-
nomic decisions are made have received increasing attention in the analy-
sis of the responsibility for economic underperformance. This attention has
in turn led to a questioning of the issues of conceptualization and measure-
ment of the variables involved. While economic variables are easily concep-
tualized and measured, political institutional factors present some diffi-
culty. Although the aim of a democratic system is to assure the rights and
freedoms for the citizens of a polity, for those polities in transition, the
processes that drive societies towards or away from higher rights and free-
doms for their citizens are more important. This paper attempts to cover
the following topics: first, to construct measurable variables of democrati-
zation that can be used to determine the level of democratic development
in a transition polity; and second, to apply these variables to determine the
level and patterns of democratization in Nigeria. Section two highlights
significant past research which has measured the levels of democracy across
different countries. In section three Nigeria’s political history is summa-
rized to show a polity in continuing political transition. Section four iden-
tifies relevant dimensions of democratization in a transition polity. Section
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five applies the dimensions to derive indices to measure the level of democ-
ratization in Nigeria. In section six the pattern of the democratization process
in Nigeria is established. Section seven justifies the measures for transi-
tion polities and suggests the use to which they may be put.
Existing Measures of Democracy
The earliest attempt to assign numerical values to the measurement of
degrees of democracy was in 1963, when Phillips Cutright constructed an
Index of National Political Development (Cutright, 1963) for 77 countries.1
The objective was to investigate the interdependence of political institu-
tions and socio-economic variables such as education, economic develop-
ment, communications and urbanization. Banking heavily on the role played
by political parties in the political life of nations, the index was based on two
indicators: (a) freedom of elections and respect for their results, and (b) the
existence and size of opposition representation in the legislature. A coun-
try was assigned one point for every year it was ruled by an executive that
emerged through free elections, one point for a year in which more than one
party was represented in the legislature and one point for every year in
which the minority party held more than 30 per cent of the legislative seats.
In viewing democracy from an historical perspective, and with a focus
on the re-distributive effects of democracy, Christopher Hewitt (1977) iden-
tified three characteristics of a political system that were capable of egali-
tarian consequences. These were an elected and responsible executive, uni-
versal manhood suffrage and fair elections. To test a double barrel hypothesis
that democracy itself leads to equality and that only the election of social-
ist legislatures is related to measures of inequality, Hewitt (1977: 450) con-
structed a “democratic index” based on simultaneous fulfillment of the
above three conditions. A country’s score was represented by the number of
years that it fulfilled the requirements of an egalitarian society, less the
number of years it did not.
Kenneth Bollen’s (1990) Index of Political Democracy focused on
two dimensions of democratic development: political sovereignty and polit-
ical liberties. Sovereignty was measured by three indicators: fairness of
elections, effective executive selection and legislative selection, while polit-
ical liberties were measured by freedom of the press, freedom of group
opposition and an absence of government sanctions. A measure of levels of
citizen participation was excluded from the index because voter turnout
reflected factors that has little to do with measuring political control. Zehra
Arat (1991: 23-24) identified four components of popular sovereignty or pub-
lic control of government which were not mutually exclusive. These included
participation, inclusiveness of the process, competition, and civil liberties
or government coerciveness. Participation was based on the extent to which
popular consent was sought in executive and legislative selection and by the
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competitiveness of the nomination procedure. Inclusiveness of the process
was measured by the absence/presence of any form of restrictions on citi-
zens aged 18 and above, while competitiveness was based on party legiti-
macy and party competition. Civil liberty was measured indirectly by a sta-
tistical estimation of the level of government coerciveness. Finally, a score
for a country’s “democraticness” (demo) with a range of 29-109 was obtained
by the following formula:
Demo = [{Participation x (1+ Inclusiveness)} +
Competitiveness] – Coerciveness.
Alex Hadenius’ Index of Democracy identified elections and political lib-
erties as the two major dimensions of citizens’ freedom to exercise their
rights (1992: 36-38). Elections were measured by two indicators; That is,
universal suffrage and how meaningful the procedure was. The former cap-
tured the franchise in two ways: the percentage of the population with the
right to vote, and the percentage of legislative seats filled by the election.
The score for the franchise was obtained as the product of the two percent-
ages. Meaningful election was scored as the sum of three variables (open-
ness + correctness + effectiveness), with each measured on a five-point
scale of zero to four. The overall score for an election was calculated as
the product of universal suffrage and meaningful election. The score for
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political liberties was obtained by adding up the scores of three indicators
(organizational freedom + freedom of opinion + political violence/oppres-
sion), each measured on a nine-point scale. A combination of elections and
political freedoms produced a 48-point scale (later converted to 11-point)
on which each of the 132 countries was rated.
Tatu Vanhanen’s Evolutionary Theory of Democratization proposed
that only two indicators—the level of competition and the extent of partic-
ipation—were empirically relevant in the struggle for power resources, and
therefore useful for measuring the degree of democracy (Vanhanen, 1997:
22-23). Vanhanen employed a formula by which competition was meas-
ured by the smaller party’s share of the votes in parliamentary and/or pres-
idential elections, while electoral participation was measured as the per-
centage of the total population who actually voted in the election. The final
index of democratization (ID) was derived by multiplying the scores of
competition and participation, and then dividing the product by 100. The idea
behind this was to emphasize that a high level of one indicator cannot com-
pensate for a low level of the other. This would be the case if either the
sum or the arithmetic mean of the two indicators were used.
Raymond Gastil’s Comparative Survey of Freedoms (2000) was based
on comprehensive checklists of political rights and civil liberties. His sur-
vey was designed to capture virtually all aspects of the political process—
what determines the presence or absence, to varying degrees, of citizens’ free-
dom to exercise their rights. The rating system for the survey consisted of
a separate seven-point scale for political freedoms and for civil liberties
(Gastil, 1991: 26-32). The score for the highest level of freedom was indi-
cated by a rating of one while the least free would be a seven. Their rating
system divided countries into categories of “free,” “partly free” and “not
free.”
Of all the measures reviewed above, only the Gastil index provides a
continuous measure for time series analyses, and has therefore remained the
most widely-used measure in politimetrics analyses (Goldsmith, 1995: 163-
64). Despite this credential the measure has not escaped criticism. In addi-
tion to the question of subjectivity commonly leveled at the measures, the
Gastil index has been criticized largely because of its perceived bias against
left-wing regimes (Hartman and Hsiao, 1988: 797-98). More serious how-
ever, is the conclusion reached in recent studies that the index exhibits very
low variability, thus denting its essence as a variable (Fedderke et al., 2001;
see also 1999). Despite clear evidence of oscillating political developments
in most postindependence African countries, rankings by the Gastil index
have remained static, assigning virtually the same rankings for several con-
secutive years (Sklar, 1995: 28). The lack of variability in the Gastil index
is a direct consequence of treating democracy as a product and not as a
process. The Gastil index is not alone in this undue emphasis on the actual
levels of freedom experienced by citizens under different political regimes.
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According to Richard Sklar, “All political systems have (and should have)
both democratic and oligarchic components…instances of acceptable oli-
garchy for the sake of effective government abound in so-called democra-
cies” (1995: 26-27; see also 1987). Similarly George Sorenson emphasizes
that even “a macro framework of democracy does not guarantee its reality
on the local level, while its authoritarian counterpart does not completely
block democratic elements on the local level” (1995: 398-99). The point
made here is that there is bound to be some degree of democracy in the
character of political leadership in even the worst authoritarian regimes.
What is therefore more important as a concept is not democracy per se but
the dynamic processes that move political systems towards or away from
the ideal—democratization.
In this paper democratization is viewed as a process of political insti-
tutional reform (or evolution) that moves between the two utopian polities
which we will term absolute democracy and total authoritarianism. In tran-
sition polities, while growing agitation by pro-democracy groups against dic-
tatorships is indicative of low levels of democratization, a promise of tran-
sition to democratic governance from a military junta can be considered as
positive democratization. In the same vein, the establishment of centres for
democratic studies as well as all forms of dissemination of ideas that pro-
mote the ideals of democracy qualify as indicators of positive democrati-
zation. However, broken promises of transition, whether in the form of
annulling election results or a refusal to hold them in the first place, denote
a negative democratization. In the section that follows Nigeria is shown to
typify a polity in transition.
Nigeria: A Polity in Transition
Nigerian politics been characterized by frequent and illegal2 (but not nec-
essarily unjustified) changes of government. The incumbent governments
that result from these changes have only a weak claim to legitimacy. Both
the government and the electorate agree that the current political order
needs to be changed, and hence the constant call for a political transition pro-
gram. While transition programs provide incumbent governments with the
minimum required legitimacy to rule, they give the electorate an opportu-
nity to have an input in the future political process. Nigeria’s experience with
democratization therefore represents a classical example of a polity in tran-
sition. At the root of the polity’s transition status is the phenomenon called
ethnic politics. The different ethnic nationalities that were banded together
for British colonial administrative convenience have struggled, since polit-
ical independence in 1960, with the problem of political coexistence as one
nation. In the struggle for political control two broad views have emerged:
the nationalists and the ethno-political faction.3 Ideologically, the former
believes that the colonial crafting of the Nigerian nation, with its concomi-
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tant pluralism, is in fact not a disadvantage at all, but rather a healthy aid
to democratic development. Ethnic politicians on the other hand believe
that the Nigerian nation is artificial, very difficult to govern as one nation
and therefore unworkable as a true democracy. Thus even when politicians
in this camp openly preach democracy, they believe their respective ethnic
interests are at risk unless they are in power.
The political struggle between nationalist and ethnic politicians in
Nigeria has produced 11 power changes between 1960 and 1993, an aver-
age of one change every three years. Three of these, with a cumulative span
of nine years, were by electoral democracy; the other eight, with a cumu-
lative span of 24 years, were by selection, following nine military inter-
ventions and one military withdrawal. With the understandable exception
of the first coup d’état,4 every military regime in Nigeria can be said to be
a transition government, each beginning with a firm promise of a quick
return to democratic rule. In January 1996 a group of army officers of
largely Southern origin sacked Tafawa Balewa’s Northern-dominated, dem-
ocratically elected government. Although the architects of that first coup did
not assume office, the military that took over the government was headed
by General Aguiyi Ironsi, who was from the South. Six months later Ironsi
was assassinated in a counter-coup carried out by Northern army officers.
The government that emerged was headed by Yakubu Gowon, a general
from the North. After prosecuting a three-year civil war, the Gowon regime
in 1970 announced a program to return the country to civil democracy by
1976. The 1975 coup led by General Muritala Mohammed was in response
to Gowon reneging on his promise to return the country to democratic rule.
Despite the assassination of Mohammed in an unsuccessful military coup,
the continuation of that regime under General Obasanjo successfully con-
cluded a transition program, installing an elected government in 1979 under
the leadership of President Shehu Shagari.
In 1984 the military, under the leadership of General Mohammed
Buhari, intervened once again in the nation’s politics, to oust President Sha-
gari. Although Buhari’s toppling of an elected government was predicated
on allegations that massive electoral rigging was employed to return Pres-
ident Shagari to a second term, it has been strongly suggested that the coup
was carried out to forestall a more nationalist military intervention and to
protect the Northern ethnic hegemony (Forest,1993: 93-98; Africa Confi-
dential, 1984a: 8-9; 1985b: 1-5). This view is further strengthened by the
relative support enjoyed by the Ibrahim Babangida regime that toppled
Buhari in a palace coup in 1985. Arguably the Babangida regime can be said
to be the most transitory. Eight of the nine years the regime was in power
were devoted to the most elaborate transition programs ever to be imple-
mented in the country. The regime undertook the socio-economic and polit-
ical empowerment of women, established preparatory political institutions,
and conducted a series of elections at all levels of government, leading to
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the inauguration of state and national assemblies as well as the appoint-
ment of state and local government executives. In a political anticlimax in
1993, the regime aborted its own transition by annulling a presidential elec-
tion judged to be one of the fairest in the nation’s history. Under pressure
from both domestic and international pro-democracy groups, the Babangida
regime withdrew to hand over power to an interim national government
(ING) under a non-elected civilian, Chief Earnest Shonekan, ostensibly so
he could conclude the transition. Other than his status as a civilian, Shon-
ekan’s choice as the head of state may have been informed by his Yoruba
ethnic origin, a move meant to assuage the anger of his tribesmen follow-
ing the annulment of the election won by Basorun Abiola, another Yoruba.
Yet this singular credential did not afford the regime any form of legiti-
macy. The pro-democracy activists (PDAs) were not favorably disposed to
the ING’s jettisoning of the Babangida transition program and its inaugu-
ration of a fresh attempt. Let by Abiola, the PDAs in October 1993 sought
and obtained a High Court declaration that the ING was in fact a null insti-
tution. The vacuum created by this declaration provided the military, under
General Sani Abacha, with another opportunity to step back into gover-
nance.
On assumption of office Abacha dismantled all the democratic insti-
tutions created by the Babangida regime and promised a new transition
program. As soon as it became clear that Abacha had no intention of over-
seeing a shift to a civil democracy, the PDAs resumed their agitation against
military rule. After stifling the opposition—including the imprisonment of
Abiola, the acclaimed winner of the 1993 presidential election—Abacha
in 1995 began a fresh transition program that was to produce an elected
government in 1999. By early 1998, when all three registered political par-
ties were forced to adopt Abacha as their sole presidential candidate, it was
clear that the military head of state intended to succeed himself. However,
Abacha died of natural cuases in June 1998 and was succeeded by another
military officer, General Abdulsalami Abubarka. In the early days of the
Abubarka regime, there was hope that Abiola would be released from prison
to head a national government, but he too died of natural causes and
Abubarka had to start a new transition program. In May 1999, it took the
regime less than 12 months to complete the shortest transition in Nigeria to
install a democratically elected government, headed by President Oluse-
gun Obasanjo.
Thus 30 of Nigeria’s 40 years of political history have been devoted
to one form of transition or another. Because these transitions were carried
out under military regimes, the actual levels of political freedom enjoyed by
Nigerians have indeed been limited. As can be seen from the Nigerian exam-
ple, the limited degrees of freedom in transition societies do not reflect a lack
of attempts to democratize; rather, they represent difficult and (as in Nige-
ria) protracted transitions. Casper (2000: 58-59) has shown that although dif-
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ficult transitions may be risky since they might perpetuate dictatorships, if
and when they succeed, they in fact “offer the highest pay off for democ-
ratization.” In a similar argument Barkan (2000: 242) used the experiences
of six African countries (which unfortunately did not include Nigeria) to
make an even stronger proposition that the line between democratic consol-
idation (or the enjoyment of liberties) and protected transitions is very thin
and blurred.
Dimensions of Democratization in a Transition Polity
Exclusive emphasis on the end product of actual freedom enjoyed by citi-
zens ignores the value of those freedoms that are being denied during tran-
sition polities. In addition, such emphases underplay the foundations the
struggles lay for future political development. For example, categorizing
Nigeria as a democratized country in 1999, simply because a democratic
election resulted in a transition from a military government to a civilian
administration (even though the country scored zero on the same rating for
the turbulent years of the Babangida and Abacha regimes,) fails to acknowl-
edge the democratic inputs of the deluge of local and international agents
which pressured the repressive regimes. Just as the presence of the inputs
fed the democratization process, their absence when the opposition was
relatively inactive has slowed down, derailed or even aborted entirely the
desired democratization process. It is important therefore that a meaning-
ful measure of democratization captures these dimensions.
The building block for the identification of the relevant dimensions of
democratization in Nigeria is the assumption that the natural rights of Niger-
ian citizens are the primary input they invest in the political process. As
illustrated in Figure 1, the democratization process in a transition polity
revolves around four main dimensions. The first is the political input level
in the form of electoral and selectoral processes by which political power
is achieved and maintained by political stakeholders. Electoral processes
result from a wider distribution of natural rights while selectoral processes
are indicative of a greater concentration of rights. Both elections and selec-
tions express the investment of rights and the delegation of authority to the
elect and select. The second level involves governance as the management
of citizens’ investible rights, the responsibility of which is shared among the
executive, legislative and judicial arms. The political environment—the
third level of the democratization process—represents the intermediate out-
put produced by the interaction of electoral and selectoral processes and
the nature and quality of governance, but also functions as an input to the
next level. As with any investment, the fourth level consists not only of the
actual rights and liberties that could be enjoyed by citizens but also the
expectations for future rights that enable them to contribute to the next
round of the democratization process. Every transition polity goes through
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these processes irrespective of whether the dominant regimes represent a mil-
itary-civil diarchy, a military-personal dictatorship or a democratic-civilian
regime. Thus four measurable dimensions of democratization can be iden-
tified as power change, quality of governance, political environment and
democratic dividend.
Power Change
Table 1 shows a detailed checklist of the criteria for ranking the indicators
relating to power change. The relevant variables here are elections and
selections. Elections include federal, regional, state and local government
electoral processes (including plebiscites), whether organized by a military
or civilian regime. Elections are measured in terms of regularity, inclusive-
ness, openness and fairness. An election is considered regular if it takes
place not later than the constitutional expiration of the incumbent’s legiti-
mate term in office. Elections are inclusive to the extent that all adults of con-
stitutional voting age are allowed to participate. They are open to the extent
that all adults of constitutional voting age are allowed to contest for any polit-
ical office and fair to the extent that there is no coercion of voters and no
corruption in the counting of votes cast.
Selections, on the other hand, are not constitutionally determined but
come about as a result of an intra-military struggle for power. In the Niger-
ian example, the military, far from being a monolithic political stakeholder
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FIGURE 1
The Democratization Process in Nigeria
04_dinneya.qxd  2004/10/06  9:50 AM  Page 355
with only one voice, was (and still is) as divided and politicized along cul-
tural, ethnic and ideological lines as are the formal political parties. In every
attempt in Nigeria to change an incumbent regime, the military has posed
as the guardian of democracy and promised a quick return to civil rule. And
in each of these occasions open support for the power change was not lack-
ing among other political stakeholders. The point made here is that the mil-
itary coup d’état has been used as a selective tool of power change during
the democratization process in Nigeria.
Thus, selection is defined here to include all successful and unsuc-
cessful attempts to change an incumbent regime, whether the incumbent
regime was elected or selected. It also includes minor changes to the exec-
utive positions of preparatory democratic institutions such as Electoral
Commissions, Transition to Civil Rule Committees and Population Com-
missions. Selection is evaluated on the basis of how peaceful or violent the
process is. It is considered peaceful if it does not generate protests and vio-
lent if it involves the loss of lives. Evidence of violent change does not
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TABLE 1
Checklist of the Democratization Index for Nigeria—Power Change
Variables Indicators Checklist of Criteria for Ranking
A: elections A1: regularity A1i: Election held every year one is called for
constitutionally.
A1ii: If an election is not held, how 
long was it delayed
A2: inclusiveness A2i: Constitutional voting age limit.
A2ii: Eligible voters prevented from voting by
electoral administrative lapses and-/or threat
from opposition.
A3: openness A3i: Special requirements-of age, education or 
ethnic or geographic background-for eligibility to 
contest political office.
A3ii: Any ban on certain citizens from
political participation.
A4: fairness A4i: Actual or threatened coercion of voters.
A4ii: Unlawful inducement of voters.
A4iii: Irregularities and/or outright corruption in
vote counting and the release or results.
B: selection B1: peaceful B1i: Selection appealed to citizens and/or
political stakeholders.
B1ii: Extent of national support for selection 
process.
B2: violent B2i: Selection resulted in loss of lives and property.
B2ii: Selection greeted by violent protests.
B2iii: Extent of national coverage of protests 
against selection or removal.
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necessarily mean the resultant regime has less democratic content than one
that resulted from peaceful means. However, the act of violence in the selec-
tion process, though unavoidable in some cases, is at least temporarily
destabilizing. Thus, while violent selection carries a negative score for
democratization, the resulting regime’s quality of governance may still
deserve a positive scoring.
Quality of Governance
A detailed checklist of the criteria for measuring the indicators relating to gov-
ernance is presented in Table 2. Since the responsibility for governance is
shared among the three arms, the variables of governance are executive qual-
ity, legislative quality and judiciary quality. Executive quality is measured
by two indicators: consultation with opposition and/or major political stake-
holders in crucial policy decision making, and civil participation in execu-
tive functions in all tiers of government. Since democracy is about establish-
ing the greatest good for the greatest number, the more widely the executive
is prepared to consult with other political stakeholders before making a cru-
cial decision, and, for example, the greater the number of civilians that are
brought into executive decision-making positions in a military-civil diarchy,
the higher the likelihood that such decisions are in the political interest of the
greater majority. Legislative quality is assessed on the bases of two indica-
tors: legislative independence and legislative function. The former attempts
to identify the existence of an elected legislature that is separated from the
executive on the basis of legal or technical rules. Legislative function recog-
nizes the dual role of the legislator as both a lawmaker for the entire nation,
and a representative of his or her constituency’s political interest. To bal-
ance these roles, the laws the legislator supports must be in the interest of his
or her constituency. Furthermore, in order to act as a check on the possible
excesses of the executive, the independence of the legislature must be guar-
anteed by law. A presidential system exemplifies a complete separation of
powers between the different arms of government. In a system where both
arms (legislative and executive) of government share membership (as in the
parliamentary system of Nigeria’s first republic) the legislature, technically
speaking is hardly separate from the executive. A legally constituted legis-
lature separate from the executive arm of government is not necessarily a
guarantee that its functions are not prone to executive interference. However,
the larger the range of interests represented in the legislature, the more dif-
ficult it will be for the executive to exert undue influence on the functions
of the legislature. Legislative function is therefore measured by the number
of parties represented in the legislature.
Judiciary quality is measured by constitutional support and independ-
ence from executive intervention. For the judiciary to dispense justice effec-
tively, the existing constitution must be fully operational. A partially sus-
pended constitution ties the so-called ‘long arm of law,’ and judicial officers
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are victims of the very poor tools they must work with. The existence of a
fully operational body of laws does not, however, guarantee the efficient dis-
pensation of justice. The judicial system needs to be independent of exec-
utive intervention of all sorts, and judicial officers’ career prospects should
be decided independently of executive patronage.
Political Environment
Table 3 presents a checklist of the criteria for evaluating a state’s political
environment. A preferred political environment for democratic development
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TABLE 2
Checklist of Democratization Index for Nigeria—Quality of Governance
Variables Indicators Checklist of Criteria for Ranking
C: executive quality C1: consultation C1i: Open debate on major policy issues.
with opposition C1ii: Arrangements made for a suitable body 
and/or other polit- to obtain public opinion on matters made of 
ical stakeholders public interest.
in major policy C1iii: Findings of such bodies made
matters known to the public.
C2: civil partici- C2i: Civilians as chief executives of federal,
pation in execu- regional, state and local governments
tive functions and government agencies.
C2ii: Civilians as chief executive officers of 
strategic public enterprises.
D: legislative quality D1: legislative D1i: Legislature elected and legally and technically
independence separate from the executive.
D1ii: Legislature elected but not technically 
separate from the executive.
D1iii: Legislature not elected and not separate 
from the executive.
D2: legislative D2i: One-party legislature.
function D2ii: Two-party legislature.
D2iii: Multiparty legislature.
E: judiciary quality E1: constitutional E1i: Constitution fully in operation.
support E1ii: Constitution partly suspended.
E1iii: Existence of legal provisions that prohibit 
courts from entertaining some cases.
E2: independence E2i: The likelihood of political 
of executive stakeholders or individuals critical of federal 
intervention government policies getting fair justice outside 
their areas of political influence.
E2ii: Executive obedience to court orders and 
unfavorable judgments.
E2iii: Career prospects of judges who pass unfavor
able judgments, likelihood of them being fired (by 
executive fiat) without due process of the law.
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is one that is both potentially and actually stable, and that enables the expres-
sion of political views that not only enhance democratization but also attack
undemocratic institutions and actions within the framework of democratic
laws. Potential stability derives from the capacity of a system to recognize
and allay the fears that might generate disagreement and agitation—particu-
larly those expressed by stakeholders not currently in power. Potential stabil-
ity does not necessarily guarantee actual stability. The political environment
is assessed on the basis of three variables: the potential for stability, the actual
level of stability, and the level of democratic struggle. The political environ-
ment is potentially stable to the extent that there is agreement among stakehold-
ers on the current socio-political order. In the political history of Nigeria rev-
enue allocation remains dominant as a tension-generating factor. There are
two dimensions to the politics of revenue allocation: on the one hand, dis-
agreements between the different tiers of government and on the other hand,
geo-political areas that lay claim to resource generation. Agitations for resource
allocation centre on the pros and cons of the principle of derivation.
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TABLE 3
Checklist of Democratization Index for Nigeria—Political Environment
Variables Indicators Checklist of Criteria for Ranking
F: potential F1: tension F1i: Calls for creation of regional, state and
for stability generation local governments.
F1ii: Calls for revenue-allocation formula to be
based on derivation.
F1iii: Disagreement over constitutional provisions
for a state religion.
F1iv: NFational character of political parties.
F2: tension F2i: Creation of regional, state and local
alleviation governments.
F2ii: Adjustments to revenue-allocation formula
to reflect derivation.
F2iii: Upholding secular status of the Nigerian
state.
G: actual level G1: law and order G1i: Absence of violent change of government
of stability/ with minimum
Instability coercion
G2: crisis and G2i: Frequency of public-sector industrial and
instability student unrest.
G2ii: State of emergency declared in any part
of the country.
G2iii: Outbreak of war.
H: democratic H1: organizational H1i: Extent and number of PDAs and NGOs
struggle framework for actively resisting undemocratic political order.
democratic struggle
H2: actual demo- H2i: Number, extent and duration of organized
cratic struggle struggles against undemocratic political decisions
by PDAs.
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Derivationists—understandably represented by oil-producing com-
munities—argue that resource control is a basic requirement for a true
federalism and that natural law should prevail; under such an arrange-
ment, the federating units retain their right to primary control of the nat-
ural resources within their borders and agree to make contributions towards
the maintenance of central public services. Anti-derivationists, on the
other hand, argue for a strong central government where no federating
unit, by virtue of the accident of historical location, retains undue finan-
cial strength capable of threatening the national interest. Conflicts among
political stakeholders in Nigeria have been expressed in various ways,
including coup d’état and counter-coup d’état, ethnic and religious vio-
lence, environmental protection campaigns and civil boycotts of govern-
ment-organized programs. However, each of these manifestations of con-
flict, all sharing the capacity to threaten the very existence of the unity of
Nigeria, has its historical and/or immediate causes traceable to revenue
allocation. To address resource allocation as a tension-generating factor,
every Nigerian government has tried to allay the fears of domination and
mitigate the effects of the perceived and/or real marginalization of minor-
ity stakeholders. Among the measures adopted have been the creation of
state, regional and local governments to bring the government presence
(which in real terms amounts to resource allocation) closer to a hitherto
neglected people. The government has also employed constitutional pro-
visions to ensure that religion is a politically neutral topic, and has put in
place party constitutional and administrative provisions to ensure that a
party is not organized in such a way that it is seen to represent only the
interests of one ethnic group.
Two indicators—tension generation and tension alleviation—are used
to capture the level of potential stability in a state. The higher the level of
agitation the less the potential for stability and vice versa. Similarly, the
greater the capacity of a political system to respond to and allay the fears
of domination the greater the potential for stability. Actual stability is a
function of peaceful co-existence and accommodation of all shades of polit-
ical opinions without coercion by the government. It is the high level of tol-
erance that allows a government to survive its term, however undemocra-
tic that government may be.
The actual level of stability is measured by two indicators: law and
order with minimal coercion, and crisis and instability. The latter is the
exact opposite of the former and is therefore treated as a negative factor of
democratization. A measure of a state’s level of law and order is captured
by the frequency with which the government is disrupted. The relevant
question here is whether a government, constitutionally elected or legally
selected, lasts its term. If a government is produced by selection, its term is
taken to be the same as that of the regime which it is replacing. The higher
the frequency of disruption, the lower the level of political stability.
360 GODSON E. DINNEYA and ASRAT TSEGAYE
04_dinneya.qxd  2004/10/06  9:50 AM  Page 360
The level of crisis and instability is indicated by the frequency of pub-
lic sector industrial unrest, the declaration of a state of emergency, and, in
an extreme case, the outbreak of civil war. Although stability is desirable for
a healthy political environment, its presence does not preclude organized
resistance against antidemocratic institutions. Agitation, especially by pro-
democracy activists, represents democratic struggle; this could take the
form of protests against, for instance, the annulment of a democratic elec-
tion by the military. Democratic struggles also include peaceful attempts at
resolving disagreements between political stakeholders.
The level of democratic struggle present is predicated upon the exis-
tence of an organizational framework for the struggle and a history of actual
struggles that have taken place. The framework for democratic struggle in
Nigeria for the period under review was provided by non-governmental
organizations. Among the numerous non-governmental organizations that
were active in the country, two groups—human rights organizations and
pro-democracy activists—were the most actively involved in challenging
the antidemocratic political decisions of successive governments. While
the former employed mostly media condemnation to express their disagree-
ment with undemocratic actions on the part of the government, the latter
physically challenged government actions by co-ordinating nation-wide
strike actions, engineering civil disobedience and spearheading mass boy-
cotts of government-sponsored programs. They issued ultimatums to selected
governments that had overstayed their corrective terms, used litigation to
unseat some governments, broadcast anti-governmental propaganda through
covert mobile media stations, and sponsored international sanctions against
selected governments.
Democratic Dividends
A checklist of the criteria for evaluating democratic dividends is pre-
sented in Table 4. A democratic dividend is defined here as the end prod-
uct of citizens’ investible natural rights and is captured by two variables:
the actual level of liberty enjoyed by citizens, and the expectation of
future liberties, referred to here as democratic hope. In countries where the
actual levels of freedom are low, as in Nigeria, democratic hope becomes
crucial. Without it those who fight to resist undemocratic institutions
would simply give up. In the absence of democratic hope the only option
is a helpless acceptance of authoritarian political systems that soon become
entrenched and then legitimized. Several times in the political history of
Nigeria the hope for a better tomorrow was the only thing that averted the
onset of justifiable anarchy and helped keep the country together. Only the
concept of democratic hope could explain the resilience of the Nigerian
electorate under the protracted transition to democracy that stretched from
1986 to 1999.
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The indicators of liberty include organizational freedom and individ-
ual freedom. Democratic hope is indicated by pronouncements in support
of, and a commitment to, democratic principles. Political pronouncements
that enhance democratic hope include promises of a return to civil rule
and/or the reiteration of such promises by military regimes. The renuncia-
tion of and/or reneging on such promises diminishes democratic hope. Com-
mitment to democratic norms includes all administrative and policy actions
by a government which empower the citizenry to participate in politics.
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TABLE 4
Checklist of Democratization Index for Nigeria—Political Environment
Variables Indicators Checklist of Criteria for Ranking
J: liberty J1: organizational J1i: Freedom to form/establish and run/practice
freedom media houses, religious organizations, non-
governmental organizations (NGOs), pro-democracy
organizations and trade unions in any part of the
country.
J1ii: Freedom to publish and broadcast all shades of
opinion without government censorship in any part
of the country.
J1iii: Freedom to advertise and solicit for member
ship of non-governmental organizations in any part 
of the country.
J1iv: Growth in the number of pro-democracy
organizations.
J2: human and J2i: Equal access of all citizens to the freedom to
minority rights live and practice lawful trade.
J2ii: Freedom from harassment including unlawful
detention and imprisonment by law enforcement 
agents.
J2iii: Freedom to associate with any lawful organi-
zation privately or publicly.
J2iv: Freedom of minorities to have their say and 
protest the will of the majority.
J2v: Freedom to join organized protest/strikes with
out threat of jobs loss.
K: political hope K1: pronouncement K1i: Promises of return to civil rule by military
regimes and a military-civil diarchy.
K1ii: Restatement or denunciation of earlier
promises.
K2: commitment K2i: Empowerment policies such as the creation of
new governmental administrative bodies at the
grassroots level.
K2ii: Establishment of preparatory democratic
bodies.
K2iii: Poverty alleviation programs that empower
the citizenry.
K2iv: Success of transition.
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These include bringing governance closer to the citizens through the creation
of regional, state and local government bodies, and the extension of polit-
ical education to the people by the establishment of preparatory democratic
bodies. Conversely, a dismantling of existing democratic institutions and the
existence of a hidden agenda demonstrate a low level of commitment to
democratization.
The Level of Democratization in Nigeria: 1960-2000
Primary Data for the Indices
Since democratization is presented in this paper as a process and not as a
product, the presence of this process in all major political activities can
only be captured by involving all major political stakeholders. The starting
point from which a measurement of democratization can best be launched
is therefore a census of the major political events that shaped the nature of
the struggle for power in Nigeria since independence. These historical polit-
ical milestones are crucial for analyzing and ranking the quality of power
change, governance, political environments and democratic dividends
enjoyed by Nigerian citizens during this period. An event is considered
political if it involves one or more political stakeholders and has an impact
on any of the four dimensions of democratization outlined above. In addi-
tion to political parties, the most relevant political stakeholders in Nigeria
for the period under review included the military, federal governments,
state governments, trade unions, university student unions, traditional rulers
and pro-democracy activists. In an underdeveloped political system such as
Nigeria, there are few political parties. Contrary to popular belief, how-
ever, the limited number of political parties and the frequent exclusion of
a number of them from active politicking by the military umpires did not
create a political monopoly for the military and make it the exclusive polit-
ical stakeholder in the struggle for power. It merely made such struggles less
competitive. In the absence of political parties other political stakeholders
were actively involved in the struggle for power. The growth of these groups
helped to broaden political participation and competition in the absence of
a fully developed party system. They also shared, albeit in varying degrees,
in the colossal failures as well as in the limited successes of the continuing
struggle for democratization.
In addition to the above primary data, secondary data on state creation, rev-
enue allocation and industrial unrest constitute part of the input for the con-
struction of the democratization indices.
Scales and Scores for the Indicators
Except for those instances in which a modified scoring system was applied,
all indicators are ranked on a 25-point scale, ranging from excellent (21-25)
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through very good (17-20), good (13-16), fair (9-12), to poor (5-8) and very
poor (1-4). The justification for this seemingly wide range is that the events
themselves covered a variety of behavior which ranked from the very high
to the dismal in terms of democratic content. The wide range therefore
ensures a level of variability consistent with the actual events. An indica-
tor retains its score for the previous year if no major event took place to alter
its quality significantly. In addition to the above scoring technique, elections,
selections and legislative quality needed special treatment. The absence of
regular democratic elections and the dominance of military-civil diarchies
in Nigeria’s political history also meant that elected legislatures were a less
than regular feature in the nation’s democratization process.
To accommodate for the fact that elections and selections were not
annual occurrences, the scoring system was modified; if an election takes
place in year one, another election is not expected (but could happen) before
the end of the term of the office holders. The years before the next election
is due are given the same score as the election year would have been given,
regardless of whether the elections are staggered and/or overlap across
years. However, if, for example, an election is due after four years yet one
is not held, then the years in the next election period (fifth to eighth years)
score on the lowest rung of the next lower range. Further delay in conduct-
ing an overdue election attracts lower points. The idea here is that the longer
that elections are delayed, the longer the period during which the incumbent
government is able to rule without a determinable mandate. Plebiscites are
not scored for the years they do not occur. To score selection for the year it
did not occur, it is recognized that since they take place as corrective power
changes, the governments they give rise to are not expected by the citi-
zenry to stay in power for more than the current tenure of the government
that they replace. Beyond this corrective period, citizens will welcome any
power change even if it is by another selective process. This is the reason
behind the initial applause that has followed every military coup d’état in
the history of Nigeria. Thus selection scores in the years outside the correc-
tive period score a higher grade than those occurring within the corrective
period.
In measuring the quality of the legislature, the military in Nigerian
politics is treated as a party with its own political interests. Legislative func-
tion in a military-civil diarchy is scored as in a one-party system and leg-
islative independence as in a system having an unelected legislative and
executive arm as one body. A score of 15 is given for legislative independ-
ence as well as for legislative function for any year in which there is an
elected multi-party legislature backed by constitutional and technical sep-
aration from the executive. A system is considered to be multi-party if at least
three registered political parties are represented in elections. A score of 10
is assigned to legislative independence as well as legislative function for any
year in which there is an elected legislature with constitutional but no tech-
nical separation from the executive and in which the legislature is two-
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party. Finally a score of 5 is given for legislative Independence as well as
legislative function for any year in which there is an un-elected legislative
body with neither constitutional nor technical separation from the executive
and in which only one party is represented. The number of demands for
new states and the percentage of revenue demanded by derivationists are
taken to be indicators of tension generation. The actual number of states and
actual percentage of revenues allocated on the basis of derivation constitutes
the data for tension alleviation.
The score for tension generation is calculated as the difference between
the demand for statehood and the actual number of states as a percentage
of that demand; that is, the percentage of unfulfilled aspiration. The level
of tension alleviation is determined by how close the system comes to meet-
ing the demands; that is, the percentage of fulfilled aspiration. The actual
number of states created as a percentage of the number demanded consti-
tutes tension alleviation due to state creation, while the percentage of rev-
enue allocated on the basis of derivation constitutes tension alleviation due
to revenue allocation. The average of these two is converted to a 25-point
scale to arrive at the score for tension alleviation.
On the assumption of a four-year term, law and order are scored by
assigning 20 points for every year of the term if an elected government sur-
vives its full term; 15 points for each of the first three years if the govern-
ment is disrupted in the last (fourth) year of its term; and 10 for each of the
first two years if the disruption is in the third year. Five points are assigned
for the first year if the disruption takes place in the second year, and zero
points are assigned where the government does not last even one full year.
If a selected government is succeeded by an elected government within its
corrective term, 12 points are assigned for every year that it lasts. Nine
points are assigned for each year if a selected regime is disrupted in the
forth year, 6 points if it lasts for three years, and 3 points if it lasts for only
two years. No point is awarded if the disruption occurs in the first year. 
When a selected regime has overstayed its corrective term,5 citizens will
clamour for its removal even if by another selection. Its continuation is
therefore potentially unstable and should reduce the state’s actual stability.
This potential instability may, however, be remedied if there is a program
in place to allow for the transition to an elected government. Thus, a score
of 9 points is awarded for every year within the corrective term of a selected
regime in which there is a program for an ongoing transition to civil rule,
and 3 points for every year beyond the corrective term. Finally, 2 points are
given for every year within the corrective period for which there is no tran-
sition program in place.
To establish a score for the crisis and instability category, three factors
are considered, in order of the indicators’ relative importance in destabiliz-
ing the democratic process. A score of 20 points is assigned for every year
in which there is an outbreak of civil war for at least four months. A score
of 15 points is given if a state of emergency is declared in any part of the coun-
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try irrespective of how long it lasts before normal governance resumes. The
number of workers participating in industrial action is converted to a 12-
point scale using a range of 100,000 to arrive at the score for crisis and insta-
bility caused by industrial unrest. The number of non-governmental organ-
izations actively challenging undemocratic actions is used to determine a
score for the category of organizational framework for democratic struggle.
Because of their relative importance to democratic struggle, human rights
organizations (HROs) are given a weight of 5 while pro-democracy activists
(PDAs) are assigned a 10. The resulting data are converted to a 25-point
scale to correspond with the general scoring technique.
The annual score for a variable is obtained by adding up the total
scores for each indicator. Where applicable, the score for a negative indi-
cator is subtracted from the total. Similarly the score for the index is the sum-
mation of the scores of the variables. Four primary and two composite
indices in line with the dimensions are obtained as shown below. The high-
est score for a variable is 25, and the highest score for a dimension is 100.
In the case of the quality of governance category, where there are six vari-
ables, the score is converted into a 100-point scale by dividing the sum by
150 (25 x 6) and multiplying by 100.
The formulae for calculating the scores are shown below:
(1) GINC = Election + Selection
GINC = Reg + Inc + Open + Fair + Peace – Violence
Where:
GINC = power change; Reg = regularity; Inc = inclusiveness;
Open = openness; Fair = fairness; Peace = peacefulness; and
Violt = violence.
(2) QIG = Executive quality + Legislative quality +Judiciary quality
QIG = (Oconsult + Civpart + LegInd + LegFtn + Consport +
JudInd) X 100/6X2 5
Where:
QIG = quality of governance; Oconsult = consultation;
Civipart = civil participation; LegInd = legislative independence;
LegFtn = legislative function; Consport = constitutional support;
and JudInd = judiciary independence.
(3) PIE = Potential stability + Actual stability - Democratic struggle
PIE = Taly - Tgen + Lorder - Crinst - (Ofds = Acds)
Where:
PIE = political environment; Taly = tension alleviation; Tgen =
tension generation; Lorder = law and order; Crinst = crisis and
instability; Ofds = organizational framework for democratic
struggle; and Acds = actual democratic struggle.
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(4) PID = Liberty + Democratic hope
PID = Orgfree = Indfree = Promt = Commit
Where:
PID = democratic dividend; Orgfree = organizational freedom;
Indfree = individual freedom; Promt = pronouncements; and
Commit = commitment.
There are two ways of arriving at a composite index (Vanhanen, 1997:
38). One is the compensatory additive formula, the other the non-compen-
satory multiplicative formula. In the latter the variables do not complement
one another. In fact, as can be observed mathematically, should one dimen-
sion return a negative score, the composite index is automatically negative.
This approximates the absolutist view that a military regime, for example,
cannot by definition have any form of democratic content. The compensa-
tory additive formula derives from the assumption that the various dimen-
sions of democratization are complementary, with improvement in one cat-
egory helping to boost scores in other categories as well. Here a simple
summation or the arithmetic average of the scores of each dimension approx-
imates a composite index capable of exhibiting all necessary characteristics
of the original scores. This is the composite measure that accords with
democratization as defined in this paper.
(5a) DIN 1 = (GINC = QIG = PIE = PID)/4
(5b) DIN 2 = GINC X QIG X PIE X PID
Where:
DIN1 = compensatory and non-compensatory composite index of
democratization and
DIN2 = non-compensatory composite index of democratization.
In all cases, the higher the score for the index, the more democratic the sys-
tem is taken to be. The scores for the indices following the formulae in
equations one to five are summarized in appendix A.
Comparing the Indices of This Study with Other Measures
To validate a new measure, it is customary in empirical literature to com-
pare it to existing measures (Vanhanen, 1997: 40-41; see also McHenry,
2000: 170-171). As noted earlier, Gastil’s indices provide the best grounds
for comparison because their ratings of political rights and civil liberties for
Nigeria covered nearly the same period as this study. Since Gastil’s ratings
rose with the decline in the level of democracy, whereas the scores of the
indices in this study rose with increases in the level of democratization, the
Gastil indices are first inverted and then converted to a scale of 100 from
their original scale of 0-7, to align with the one in this study. Finally a com-
posite index for the Freedom House (See Vanhanen, 1997: 38) measures is
calculated using the formula in equation (5a). The correlation matrix of the
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four primary and two variants of the composite indices, and Gastil’s two
indices including the derived Freedom House Composite Index (FHC Index),
are presented in Table 5.
The results show that both the primary and composite indices are positively
correlated with the two Gastil indices. Two of the four primary indices, the
QIG and the PID, are strongly correlated with both political freedom and civil
liberty. The GINC is strongly correlated with political freedom. Both the PIE
and the GINC are fairly correlated with civil liberty. The correlation between
the PIE and political freedom is relatively weak albeit positive. The com-
posite index derived by the arithmetic mean of the two Gastil indices is
very strongly correlated with the DIN1. Correlation with the DIN2 is under-
standably very weak, but it is still positive.
Patterns of Democratization in Nigeria
Figure 2 plots the graph of the scores for the four primary indices. As can
be seen, the GINC had a fair start with political independence in 1960. It
improved in 1961 but relapsed to its 1960 level in 1962. By 1993 the index
started a slide culminating in the chaotic civil war that dipped the index to
an all-time low. It remained very low even after the civil war until 1978 when
a transition program was instituted to kick start a recovery. The recovery was
sustained for the next four years, a direct reflection of the importance of dem-
ocratic elections in power change. The vicious selection of the Buhari
regime was reflected in the deterioration of the index, which did not recover
until 1987. The high scores from 1987 to 1992, unusual for a period of mil-
itary rule, reflected a high level of quasi-electoral processes that marked the
period of Babangida’s transition program. Although many argue that the
longest transition program in Africa led the country nowhere (Osaghae,
1998: 207-225), it would appear that those seemingly wasted years actually
laid the foundation for the eventual democratic power change that was
achieved in the years to come.
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TABLE 5
Correlation of Gastil’s Indices with the Indices of Democratization for
Nigeria
Political Freedom Civil Liberty FHC Index
GINC 0.759c 0.514c 0.670c
QIG 0.917c 0.750c 0.897c
PIE 0.403a 0.526c 0.473c
PID 0.877c 0.924c 0.940c
DIN1 0.908c 0.808c 0.914c
DIN2 0.356a 0.193 0.310
[N = 29: df = 27; = 349 (a = 5 %), 409 (b = 2 %), 449 (c = 1 %)]
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With the exception of the civil war years, no period fared so dismally in the
scores for power change as those from 1993 to 1998. Arguably the Abacha
regime was an “unlucky” one. First, it coincided with the frustrations of
the aftermath of a lengthy transition that ended with the annulment of the
June 12, 1993 elections. Second, with the crumbling of an early romance
between the regime and the protagonists of the June 12 election results
revalidation, the latter had come to believe that Abacha himself (and not the
former leader, Ibrahim Babangida) was to blame for the annulment. 
Against these backdrops, the selectoral processes of the regime’s tran-
sition program enjoyed very little acceptance among the citizens. The scores
improved following the return of full electoral power change in 1999 but they
were still below the 1960 level. The quality of governance index (QIG) and
the index of democratic dividends (PID) followed almost the same pattern
as the GINC, with the exception that the QIG exhibited relative stabile
across the period 1967-1977. All three indices enjoyed the rejuvenating
effects of a return to civil rule in 1979, with the PID recovering faster than
the QIG or the GINC. After the shock caused by the disruption of an elected
regime in 1984, the QIG and the PID recovered faster and maintained rel-
ative stability, albeit at a level below the GINC. All three indices clearly fol-
lowed an undulating pattern. A brief period of relatively high scores was fol-
lowed by a free fall and deteriorating scores. The index for the political
environment deserves special comment. Except for a very brief period from
1970-1972, when it was higher than the GINC, it remained below any of the
other three measures. Although the same undulating trend was observed in
the PIE, of particular note was that it remained negative longer than it was
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FIGURE 2
Nigeria: Dimensions of Democratization, 1960-2000
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positive, an indication that neither civil nor military-civil diarchies had pro-
vided any meaningful level of political environment.
The composite indices are plotted in Figure 3, DIN1 clearly exhibited
the same pattern observed in the GINC, the QIG and the PID. This is under-
standable because by definition it represents the arithmetic mean of the four
primary indices, with each dimension compensating for the shortcomings of
the other. As can be seen from the second DIN2, only in very brief periods
from 1960-1965 and 1979-1983 was democracy actually lifted off the start-
ing block (the origin in Figure 2). As noted earlier, this is a representation of
the absolutist view of democracy as a product with a binary quantity. Either
it is considered to have been present (as in these two brief periods) or it is
deemed to have been completely absent. It has already been argued that this
view of democracy does not accord with democratization in Africa.
Concluding Remarks
One may well ask: What is new in these indices, and what is the relevance
of this exercise? Certainly not the absence of subjectivity. An index of
democratization totally immune from subjectivity is yet to be constructed.
Neither is there a set of variables and indicators that can be considered the
only ones capable of capturing democratic developments in any country.
However, constructing political indices on the basis of actual historical
events that typified the character of political leadership and the process of
political development (even though it is not feasible to capture all events)
will leave both the indices and their construction procedure open for veri-
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FIGURE 3
Nigeria: Patterns of Democratization 1960-2000
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fication. Verifiable historical occurrences help to assess the level of subjec-
tivity associated with an index. Its advantage over the existing measurers
reviewed above derives largely from the nature of political developments
in transition polities.
Thus the justification for the construction of the indices may be summarized
as follows:
1. Existing measures other than the Gastil indices do not possess the char-
acteristic of continuity required for the analysis of national democratic
development. The only continuous measure, however, in addition to
suffering from very low variability, also does not meet the definitional
context of democratization (as a process) in this study.
2. In line with treating democratization as a process rather than a product,
the indices in this study capture the peculiar characteristics of the democ-
ratization process in transition polities. The construction introduces two
new variables that are dominant in the democratization process in Nige-
ria. These are the concepts of selection in power change, and demo-
cratic hope in democratic dividends. Unlike that of existing measures,
the construction here highlights that there is some democratic content
even in a selection process. It also emphasizes the point that the hope
for future improvements is a positive indicator of democratization.
The indices are therefore an improvement on existing measures for countries
where the actual levels of freedom are low, irrespective of continuous efforts
at democratization. The relevance of measures such as these is that they pro-
vide a basis for evaluating the progress of the democratization process in tran-
sition polities. In addition, they can be used to test the hypothesis that low
levels or a lack of democratization may be responsible for poor economic per-
formance. While some of the indicators have drawn from Nigeria’s political
experience, they are certainly not unique to that country. Across the African
continent, resource allocation among ethnic nationalities continues to play
a crucial role in national political developments. This is true of the diamond-
rich Democratic Republic of Congo, Angola and Liberia, of post-colonial
gold-rich Ghana, and more recently of tiny oil-rich Sao Tome and Principe.
In addition the concept of democratic hope is especially applicable to many
African polities where the struggle for democracy has been more notable
than any sustained democratic rule. There is also no denying that ethnic pol-
itics and selectoral processes have become native to post-colonial Africa.
As noted earlier, the construction of an index need not be perfect. It is
expected that this attempt will elicit new interest in the evaluation of national
political developments, which appear to have been ignored lately in favor
of cross-country comparative analyses. Further research should move
towards the adaptation (rather than the replication) of the indices devel-
oped in this paper in order to study democratic developments in other tran-
sition polities.
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Appendix A: Summary of Indices of Democratization for
Nigeria 1960-2000
Notes
1 For earlier attempts at a dichotomous classification of political systems see Olsen (1968).
For the most recent classification of political systems see Africa Demos (1994)
2 Antidemocratic legal systems of authoritarian regimes are constantly under attack by pro-
democracy activists. Therefore the removal of such regimes, even by force, is normally
viewed as justified.
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YEAR GINC QIG PIE PID DIN1 DIN2
1960 64.000 68.000 37.711 69.000 59.678 11.324
1961 75.000 68.000 36.711 70.000 62.428 13.106
1962 64.000 64.000 21.711 64.000 53.428 5.692
1963 62.000 66.667 41.763 64.000 58.607 11.048
1964 47.000 65.333 42.763 61.000 54.024 8.010
1965 42.000 64.000 26.284 58.000 47.571 4.098
1966 -5.000 34.667 2.284 31.000 15.738 -0.012
1967 -8.000 35.333 4.538 24.000 13.968 -0.031
1968 -14.000 30.667 1.538 24.000 10.551 -0.016
1969 -17.000 30.667 0.256 24.000 9.481 -0.003
1970 8.000 34.000 25.983 42.000 27.496 0.297
1971 10.000 32.667 41.338 42.000 31.501 0.567
1972 12.000 32.667 36.315 45.000 31.495 0.641
1973 14.000 30.000 38.368 46.000 32.092 0.741
1974 9.000 32.000 38.195 37.000 29.049 0.407
1975 13.000 31.333 25.342 44.000 28.419 0.454
1976 10.000 32.000 39.157 48.000 32.289 0.601
1977 13.000 34.000 36.990 50.000 33.498 0.817
1978 13.000 37.333 35.792 56.000 35.531 0.973
1979 69.000 64.667 35.140 60.000 57.202 9.408
1980 72.000 68.000 44.105 70.000 63.526 15.116
1981 74.000 67.333 43.815 65.000 62.537 14.191
1982 72.000 67.333 44.890 64.000 62.056 13.928
1983 42.000 66.000 40.904 63.000 52.976 7.143
1984 6.000 28.000 22.684 32.000 22.171 0.122
1985 10.000 32.667 21.666 32.000 24.083 0.226
1986 11.000 32.667 34.204 32.000 27.468 0.393
1987 72.000 31.333 39.582 38.000 45.229 3.393
1988 61.000 34.000 32.728 39.000 41.682 2.647
1989 63.000 35.333 33.129 41.000 43.116 3.024
1990 55.000 33.333 37.136 42.000 41.867 2.859
1991 58.000 34.000 45.217 42.000 44.804 3.745
1992 54.000 41.333 48.634 38.000 45.492 4.125
1993 11.000 38.667 45.009 26.000 30.169 0.498
1994 3.000 26.667 55.760 17.000 25.607 0.076
1995 3.000 26.667 64.194 17.000 27.715 0.087
1996 3.000 24.667 63.023 18.000 27.172 0.084
1997 3.000 20.667 54.049 16.000 23.429 0.054
1998 12.000 26.667 50.383 48.000 34.262 0.774
1999 56.000 64.000 52.333 58.000 57.583 10.879
2000 56.000 64.000 57.333 58.000 58.833 11.918
Source: Calculated by author from equations 1-5.
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3 Although no Nigerian politician approves of being labeled ethnic, it has not been diffi-
cult for many analysts to identify successful politicians with a large ethnic following.
4 The Ironsi regime which benefited from the partial success of the first coup did not show
any indication that it shared nationalist aspirations of the architects of the military inter-
vention. Neither did it have time to design its own transition program before it was top-
pled.
5 The corrective term of a selected regime is the equivalent of one term of the adminis-
tration it replaced.
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